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Emotions and Actions Associated with Altruistic Helping and Punishment
Omar Tonsi Eldakar, Department of Biology, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York 13902 USA. Email:
omar.eldakar@binghamton.edu.
David Sloan Wilson, Department of Biology and Department of Anthropology, Binghamton University,
Binghamton, New York 13902 USA.
Rick O’Gorman, Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP UK.

Abstract: Evolutionary altruism (defined in terms of fitness effects) exists in the context of
punishment in addition to helping. We examine the proximate psychological mechanisms that
motivate altruistic helping and punishment, including the effects of genetic relatedness, potential
for future interactions, and individual differences in propensity to help and punish. A cheater
who is a genetic relative provokes a stronger emotional reaction than a cheater who is a stranger,
but the behavioral response is modulated to avoid making the transgression public in the case of
cheating relatives. Numerous behavioral differences are not accompanied by emotional
differences, suggesting that other psychological mechanisms dictate the specific response to
emotion-provoking events. Paradoxically, there is a positive correlation between temptation to
cheat and propensity to punish others for cheating, leading to a concept of “selfish punishment”
that has been substantiated by a computer simulation model. This study demonstrates that
fictional scenarios can provide an important methodological tool for studying the psychological
basis of helping and punishment.
Keywords: altruism, punishment, helping, cheating, altruistic punishment, selfish punishment.


Introduction
Altruism and punishment are often contrasted with each other in discussions of human
social behavior. An altruist helps others as an end in itself and does not require the threat of
punishment. Punishment imposes a cost on non-altruists, making the more selfish alternatives
prohibitive.
The recently coined phrase altruistic punishment reflects the fact that punishment is often
costly for the individual who punishes in addition to the one who is punished (Bowles and
Gintis, 2004; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson, 2003). In addition, the benefits of curtailing
selfish activities by punishment are often shared by a larger group that includes but is not
restricted to the punisher. When these conditions are met, punishment becomes an act of altruism
in the evolutionary sense of the word, by increasing the fitness of others at the expense of one’s
own fitness, or in economic terms by providing a public good at private expense.
To clarify the concept of altruistic punishment, consider a n-person game theory model in
which individuals vary for two traits, helping (H) vs. non-helping (NH) and punishing (P) vs.

Emotions and Actions Associated with Altruistic Helping and Punishment

non-punishing (NP), yielding four strategies: H/P, H/NP, NH/P, and NH/NP. The presence of
punishers reduces the fitness of non-helpers and the incidence of non-helping, either by
suppressing their behavior or by causing them to leave the group, to the benefit all helpers in the
group (not just the punishers). Given these assumptions, it is always the case that H/NP is more
fit than H/P within a single group if there is any cost of punishment. Something must be added to
the model to make punishment evolutionarily stable, such as between-group selection (Bowles
and Gintis, 2004), punishing the non-punishers (which seems to lead to an infinite regress), or
conformance cultural transmission (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Fehr, 2004). It is also
possible that punishment is evolutionarily unstable in modern social environments, requiring
ancestral conditions such as small groups of related individuals that are no longer present
(Johnson, Stopka, and Knights, 2003).
These debates about the altruistic nature of punishment are based entirely on fitness
effects. Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally defined altruism in terms of motives,
or, in evolutionary terms, the proximate psychological mechanisms that motivate behaviors
(Sober and Wilson, 1998). From this perspective it is obvious that punishment is motivated by
very different psychological mechanisms (e.g., anger and moral outrage) than the helping
behaviors typically associated with altruism (e.g., empathy and sympathy).
Recently, O’Gorman, Wilson and Miller (2005) reported an intriguing difference in the
psychological response to fictional scenarios that invoke altruistic helping and altruistic
punishment. The altruistic helping response was sensitive to genetic relatedness and potential for
future interactions, as expected for all forms of altruism (defined in terms of fitness effects)
based on kin selection and reciprocity theory. The altruistic punishment response was insensitive
to these variables, even though the individuals were clearly motivated to punish in a way that
would benefit others at their own expense. O’Gorman et al. measured the psychological response
to the fictional scenarios with a relatively small number of questions, such as “How much would
you pay to punish the transgressor?” for the punishment scenarios and “How much would you
pay to help the person?” in the helping scenarios. In this study, we investigate the psychological
mechanisms associated with helping vs. punishment in more detail by having the participants
respond to an inventory of words connoting emotion and action. Before proceeding, however, it
is important to justify the use of fictional scenarios as an experimental research method.
A comment on methods
Experimental economists have had a large impact on the study of human social behavior,
including the concept of altruistic punishment (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2004, Fehr 2004). While
their interests overlap broadly with those of social and evolutionary psychologists, they tend to
adhere to two strong methodological norms; a) never use deception, and b) participants must
actually play the games with each other and receive monetary payment. By these standards,
experimental economists discount much of the social and evolutionary psychological literature,
including the use of fictional scenarios, as methodologically flawed. We think that these norms
are unduly restrictive and themselves need to be critiqued. We are not arguing against the study
of “real” behavior and monetary payment, of course, but rather for a diversity of research
methods. As Robert Putnam (1992, p. 12) put it, “The prudent social scientist, like the wise
investor, must rely on diversification to magnify the strengths, and offset the weaknesses, of any
single instrument.”
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The norm against deception is based upon the erosion of trust. Even though a single
experiment might gain from the use of deception, it cultivates an attitude of mistrust in the
participant population. This is a legitimate problem that needs to be taken seriously by the social
scientific community. The norm about “real” behavior and monetary payment is more difficult to
justify. The whole thrust of the experimental economics literature is that human behavior cannot
be explained by the utility maximizing principle of rational choice theory. People are not driven
entirely by monetary concerns but by psychological mechanisms that must be discovered
experimentally. Altruistic punishers, for example, are motivated to punish transgressions even at
their own monetary expense. If so, then it is ironic to insist that participants will lack motivation
unless they receive monetary payment. Participants need to make a good faith effort, which
requires motivation, but monetary payment only serves as a means to this end. Monetary
payment can even undermine motives to cooperate by transforming a normative situation into a
market transaction in the minds of the participants (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, and Wilke,
2006).
As for the necessity of studying “real” behavior, this assumes that mental responses to
fictional scenarios and other hypothetical situations are somehow “unreal.” Scientists from
diverse fields are beginning to recognize the importance of narratives in human psychological
and cultural processes. At the neurobiological level, there is evidence that vicarious events are
processed by the same circuits as actual events (Bechara, 2002; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, and
Dolan, 2002). At the level of individual cognition, narratives are constructed internally to
organize experience and rehearse alternative courses of actions (e.g., Bruner, 2002; Cosmides
and Tooby 2000; Pennebaker and Seagal 1999). Above the level of the individual, narratives are
essential for social transmission and the organization of culture (e.g., Sternberg 1998; Wilson
2002). Even when responses to fictional scenarios do not correspond directly to responses to
real-world events, they can reveal psychological mechanisms that motivate real-world behavior
in a more complex fashion. The fact that stories engage such interest is a clue to their
psychological relevance. It is as if the mind is designed to avidly seek and process information in
the form of stories, providing a form of motivation that can equal or exceed monetary payment.
Against this background, it is possible to justify a rigorous scientific methodology based
on fictional scenarios, which includes the following elements (see also Wilson and O’Gorman,
2003):
1) Construct a fictional scenario based on the subject of interest (in our case altruistic
helping and punishment).
2) Create alternative versions of the scenario that alter key independent variables (in our
case, helping vs. punishment, genetic relatives vs. strangers, and potential vs. no potential for
future interactions).
3) Measure the response to the independent variables with a number of hypothesisoriented questions, such as willingness to invest one’s own resources to help or punish in our
case.
4) In addition to focused questions, we also recommend a more general exploration of
emotions and actions elicited by the fictional scenarios (Wilson and O’Gorman, 2003). This can
be accomplished by asking one set of participants how they would feel and act, using their openended responses to generate a list of emotion and action words, and then measuring the responses
of a second set of participants to these words on a numerical scale. This method has the
advantage of sampling the emotional and behavioral repertoires of the participant population,
including mechanisms and strategies that might not have occurred to the investigators.
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5) It is important to include measures of individual differences among the participants.
Behavioral responses to experimental economics games are profoundly variable, whether the
games are virtual or real. Some individuals cooperate while other cheat; some punish while
others refrain. Psychological differences presumably underlie these behavioral differences,
which can be investigated with fictional scenarios.
6) Finally, studies involving response to fictional scenarios should be integrated with
studies involving response to real-world events, since the relationship between them might well
be complex and indirect rather than simple and direct.
To summarize, fictional scenarios easily deserve to be one of the tools in the social
scientific toolkit. With these general comments in mind, we can proceed to our particular study.
Methods
The fictional scenario asked the reader to imagine joining an investment club whose
members contribute $1000 each to play the stock market. In the punishment version, the
investments break even except for a cheater who is discovered to have concealed $200 in profits
for himself or herself (the wording was gender neutral). In the helping version, the investments
break even and one member is discovered to need help with emergency medical costs. In both
versions, genetic relatedness was manipulated by describing the members as cousins vs.
strangers. Potential for future interactions was manipulated by describing the cheater or member
needing help as still present or having moved to another town (see O’Gorman et al., 2005, for
details).
In addition to the basic questions used by O’Gorman et al. (2005), we asked an initial set
of volunteer student participants (N=15; 6 females, 9 males) to list words that indicate “how
would you feel?” and “how would you act?” in response to the scenarios. Their lists were
merged to create the emotion and action words shown in Table 1 for the punishment scenario and
Table 2 for the helping scenario. When compiling the word lists, we erred on the side of
“splitting” rather than “lumping” since words that seemed synonymous to us might be different
in the minds of the participants. These lists can be regarded as the emotional and behavioral
repertoire of the participant population, sampled without respect to any particular hypothesis (see
Wilson and O’Gorman, 2003, for additional discussion).
The quantitative study was conducted on 330 undergraduate students from Binghamton
University’s human subject pool (183 females, 126 males, 21 unrecorded) who participated for
course research credit as part of a mass testing session. The punishment and helping scenarios
and four treatments within each scenario (cousins vs. unrelated and still present vs. moved away)
were distributed in random order and each participant responded to a single scenario. After
reading the scenario, participants responded to the basic questions and indicated how they would
feel and act by responding to the emotion and action words on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much).
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Table 1: Initial questions and emotion/action inventory for the punishment scenario.

Basic questions
How sorry would you feel?
How likely would you be to help?
What is the most money that you would contribute?
How angry at those unwilling to help?
Emotion words
Apathetic
Concerned
Disdainful
Empathetic
Foolish
Hopeful
Irresponsible
Nothing
Passive
Pity
Sad
Scornful
Sorry
Sympathetic
Unconcerned
Worried
Action words
Act rude
Act standoffish
Assist in fundraising
By mildly helpful
Express sympathy
Find out expenses
Help if very serious
Lend money
Not bring it up
See if they ask for help
Try to help

Relative

Stranger

Future

No Future

Male

Female

7.23(1.54)
7.23(1.58)
1807(3181)
5.22(2.44)

6.77(1.87)
6.48(1.98)
602(1283)
5.23(2.18)

7.08(1.74)
7.02(1.70)
1286(2449)
5.36(2.17)

6.93(1.70)
6.70(1.94)
1157(2606)
5.08(2.45)

6.84(1.81)
6.73(1.90)
1655(3137)
4.85(2.33)

7.16(1.69)
6.98(1.83)
913(1904)
5.46(2.32)

3.57(2.45)
6.69(2.02)
2.89(1.88)
6.07(2.42)
3.42(2.32)
6.42(2.34)
3.32(2.45)
2.20(1.76)
2.65(1.87)
5.85(2.41)
6.28(2.02)
2.61(2.07)
6.55(2.16)
6.74(2.25)
2.74(2.09)
6.12(2.37)

4.04(2.59)
6.38(2.03)
2.93(1.68)
5.75(2.39)
3.36(1.94)
6.00(2.35)
3.44(2.28)
2.76(2.50)
3.45(2.11)
6.13(2.12)
6.12(2.22)
2.50(1.87)
6.30(2.26)
6.69(2.10)
2.97(2.20)
5.84(2.23)

4.03(2.66)
6.64(2.12)
3.05(1.82)
6.20(2.15)
3.34(2.00)
6.19(2.59)
3.37(2.35)
2.74(2.31)
2.86(1.91)
5.67(2.31)
6.08(2.18)
2.52(1.81)
6.18(2.34)
6.71(2.25)
2.86(1.12)
6.09(2.34)

3.55(2.36)
6.43(1.93)
2.77(1.74)
5.61(2.61)
3.45(2.28)
6.10(2.31)
3.39(2.39)
2.21(1.98)
3.23(2.13)
6.32(2.19)
6.33(2.05)
2.59(2.14)
6.70(2.04)
6.72(2.11)
2.84(2.18)
5.87(2.28)

4.16(2.42)
6.14(2.04)
2.93(1.67)
5.68(2.36)
3.64(2.31)
6.06(2.48)
3.73(2.50)
2.58(1.89)
3.24(1.97)
6.06(2.34)
6.31(2.09)
2.72(2.16)
6.52(2.14)
6.56(2.20)
3.34(2.32)
5.71(2.33)

3.53(2.60)
6.85(2.03)
2.78(1.81)
6.07(2.52)
3.26(2.06)
6.24(2.52)
3.21(2.30)
2.46(2.39)
2.93(2.11)
5.92(2.28)
6.14(2.17)
2.43(1.88)
6.37(2.32)
6.80(2.21)
2.56(2.04)
6.24(2.27)

1.70(1.30)
2.38(2.11)
6.78(2.38)
4.34(1.97)
7.37(2.06)
6.92(1.51)
8.07(2.19)
6.52(2.01)
3.07(2.69)
4.90(2.69)
7.32(1.75)

1.75(1.20)
3.16(1.97)
5.88(2.41)
4.77(2.10)
7.10(2.02)
5.90(2.47)
7.36(1.92)
5.62(2.30)
3.76(2.09)
5.50(2.08)
6.44(2.30)

1.67(1.28)
2.73(1.88)
6.68(2.18)
4.45(2.17)
7.23(1.93)
6.75(2.18)
7.71(1.61)
6.21(2.07)
3.25(1.92)
4.93(2.39)
7.06(2.00)

1.77(1.22)
2.78(1.86)
6.01(2.38)
4.65(2.35)
7.25(2.08)
6.11(2.42)
7.74(1.89)
5.74(2.44)
3.55(2.22)
5.45(2.46)
6.73(2.14)

1.91(1.32)
2.91(1.87)
6.17(2.42)
4.96(2.30)
7.00(2.20)
6.58(2.31)
7.71(1.87)
5.88(2.26)
3.66(2.21)
5.03(2.25)
6.88(2.19)

1.60(1.21)
2.63(1.85)
6.56(2.17)
4.18(2.16)
7.40(1.86)
6.39(2.33)
7.76(1.70)
6.03(2.30)
3.20(2.01)
5.16(2.58)
6.97(2.01)

Relative
vs.
Stranger

Present
vs.
Male vs.
Female
Absent

**
**

*

**

*

**
*
*
**
*
*
**

Note: Rows indicate the initial survey questions and emotion and action words. Columns indicate
the mean value (with standard deviation in parentheses) of dollar amounts (for rows 3-4) or
agreement on a 9 point scale (for all other rows) when the cheater was a relative vs. a stranger,
presence vs. absence of potential for future interactions, and the response of male and female
participants. The final three columns indicate the main effects of an ANOVA (* = <.05, ** =
<.01, *** = <.001, **** = <.0001). Full statistical results are available upon request.
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Table 2: Initial questions and emotion/action inventory for helping scenario.

Basic questions
How sorry would you feel?
How likely would you be to help?
What is the most money that you would contribute?
How angry at those unwilling to help?
Emotion words
Apathetic
Concerned
Disdainful
Empathetic
Foolish
Hopeful
Irresponsible
Nothing
Passive
Pity
Sad
Scornful
Sorry
Sympathetic
Unconcerned
Worried
Action words
Act rude
Act standoffish
Assist in fundraising
By mildly helpful
Express sympathy
Find out expenses
Help if very serious
Lend money
Not bring it up
See if they ask for help
Try to help

Relative

Stranger

Future

No Future

Male

Female

7.23(1.54)
7.23(1.58)
1807(3181)
5.22(2.44)

6.77(1.87)
6.48(1.98)
602(1283)
5.23(2.18)

7.08(1.74)
7.02(1.70)
1286(2449)
5.36(2.17)

6.93(1.70)
6.70(1.94)
1157(2606)
5.08(2.45)

6.84(1.81)
6.73(1.90)
1655(3137)
4.85(2.33)

7.16(1.69)
6.98(1.83)
913(1904)
5.46(2.32)

3.57(2.45)
6.69(2.02)
2.89(1.88)
6.07(2.42)
3.42(2.32)
6.42(2.34)
3.32(2.45)
2.20(1.76)
2.65(1.87)
5.85(2.41)
6.28(2.02)
2.61(2.07)
6.55(2.16)
6.74(2.25)
2.74(2.09)
6.12(2.37)

4.04(2.59)
6.38(2.03)
2.93(1.68)
5.75(2.39)
3.36(1.94)
6.00(2.35)
3.44(2.28)
2.76(2.50)
3.45(2.11)
6.13(2.12)
6.12(2.22)
2.50(1.87)
6.30(2.26)
6.69(2.10)
2.97(2.20)
5.84(2.23)

4.03(2.66)
6.64(2.12)
3.05(1.82)
6.20(2.15)
3.34(2.00)
6.19(2.59)
3.37(2.35)
2.74(2.31)
2.86(1.91)
5.67(2.31)
6.08(2.18)
2.52(1.81)
6.18(2.34)
6.71(2.25)
2.86(1.12)
6.09(2.34)

3.55(2.36)
6.43(1.93)
2.77(1.74)
5.61(2.61)
3.45(2.28)
6.10(2.31)
3.39(2.39)
2.21(1.98)
3.23(2.13)
6.32(2.19)
6.33(2.05)
2.59(2.14)
6.70(2.04)
6.72(2.11)
2.84(2.18)
5.87(2.28)

4.16(2.42)
6.14(2.04)
2.93(1.67)
5.68(2.36)
3.64(2.31)
6.06(2.48)
3.73(2.50)
2.58(1.89)
3.24(1.97)
6.06(2.34)
6.31(2.09)
2.72(2.16)
6.52(2.14)
6.56(2.20)
3.34(2.32)
5.71(2.33)

3.53(2.60)
6.85(2.03)
2.78(1.81)
6.07(2.52)
3.26(2.06)
6.24(2.52)
3.21(2.30)
2.46(2.39)
2.93(2.11)
5.92(2.28)
6.14(2.17)
2.43(1.88)
6.37(2.32)
6.80(2.21)
2.56(2.04)
6.24(2.27)

1.70(1.30)
2.38(2.11)
6.78(2.38)
4.34(1.97)
7.37(2.06)
6.92(1.51)
8.07(2.19)
6.52(2.01)
3.07(2.69)
4.90(2.69)
7.32(1.75)

1.75(1.20)
3.16(1.97)
5.88(2.41)
4.77(2.10)
7.10(2.02)
5.90(2.47)
7.36(1.92)
5.62(2.30)
3.76(2.09)
5.50(2.08)
6.44(2.30)

1.67(1.28)
2.73(1.88)
6.68(2.18)
4.45(2.17)
7.23(1.93)
6.75(2.18)
7.71(1.61)
6.21(2.07)
3.25(1.92)
4.93(2.39)
7.06(2.00)

1.77(1.22)
2.78(1.86)
6.01(2.38)
4.65(2.35)
7.25(2.08)
6.11(2.42)
7.74(1.89)
5.74(2.44)
3.55(2.22)
5.45(2.46)
6.73(2.14)

1.91(1.32)
2.91(1.87)
6.17(2.42)
4.96(2.30)
7.00(2.20)
6.58(2.31)
7.71(1.87)
5.88(2.26)
3.66(2.21)
5.03(2.25)
6.88(2.19)

1.60(1.21)
2.63(1.85)
6.56(2.17)
4.18(2.16)
7.40(1.86)
6.39(2.33)
7.76(1.70)
6.03(2.30)
3.20(2.01)
5.16(2.58)
6.97(2.01)

Relative
vs.
Stranger

Present
vs.
Male vs.
Female
Absent

**
**

*

**

*

**
*
*
**
*
*
**

Note: Rows indicate the initial survey questions and emotion and action words. Columns indicate
the mean value (with standard deviation in parentheses) of dollar amounts (for row 3) and
agreement on a 9 point scale (for all other rows) when the person needing help was a relative vs.
a stranger, presence vs. absence of potential for future interactions, and the response of male and
female participants. The final three columns indicate the main effects of an ANOVA (* =
<.05, ** = <.01, *** = <.001, **** = <.0001). Full statistical results are available upon request.
Results
For the questions that they share in common, the results of this study are largely
consistent with those of O’Gorman et al. (2005), as shown for the punishment scenario in Figure
1. It is important to show the full distribution of responses because they are highly non-normal
and informative in their own right. The most frequent response to question 1 (“how angry would
you feel toward this person?”) was the maximum response of 9 (Figure 1A). The desire to punish
was also strong, peaking at a value of 7 (Figure 1B). Most participants thought that the cheater
should pay back what was stolen (the modal value is $200) but some indicated much more
(Figure 1C). Despite the anger and desire to punish reported in questions 1 and 2, the amount
that the subjects were willing to pay to punish was highly variable (Figure 1D), including 54%
who were unwilling to pay anything and a few individuals who indicated willingness to pay
exorbitant amounts. Anger toward non-punishers was more muted than toward the cheater but
still reached high values for some individuals (Figure 1E). Finally, most participants felt that
they would not be tempted to cheat in this situation but a sizeable proportion was tempted to
varying degrees (Figure 1F).
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These results indicate that the fictional scenarios were successful at engaging a strong
psychological response from the participants. The surprising result of O’Gorman et al. (2005)
was that the response was not influenced by genetic relatedness or potential for future
interaction, at least in terms of the basic questions listed in rows 1-6 of Table 1. This result must
be revised for genetic relatedness, although not for future interactions, on the basis of the present
study. Not only was there a minor effect of genetic relatedness for the basic question “How
angry would you feel?”, but numerous effects were revealed by the inventory of emotion and
action words. With respect to emotions, in addition to feeling more angry, participants also felt
more betrayed, disappointed, disgusted, hurt, and shocked at cheating by a cousin than by a
stranger. With respect to action, participants indicated a greater likelihood of confronting and
seeking an apology from a relative than a stranger, they but were more likely to warn others of a
stranger than a relative. With respect to sex differences, men indicated a greater willingness to
demand money, ostracize, physically hurt, threaten, and yell at the cheater than women.
The distribution of responses to the first four questions of the helping scenario are shown
in Figure 2, indicating a strong empathetic response (2A) and desire to help (2B), a highly
skewed distribution in the amount willing to pay (2C), and the full spectrum of anger toward
others not willing to help (2D). The first four lines of Table 2 show that genetic relatedness
strongly influences desire to help and amount of money contributed (similar to the previous
study) but no effect of potential for future interactions (unlike the previous study). The inventory
of emotion and action words enable the psychological response to helping to be examined in
more detail. Surprisingly, the effect of genetic relatedness did not take place at the level of
emotional response (with the exception of the word “passive”) but primarily at the level of
behavioral response. Participants reported a greater willingness to help cousins than strangers,
but not because they had a greater emotional response to their dilemma. With respect to sex
differences females exhibited greater concern and willingness to help than males.
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Figure 1. Histograms indicating dollar amounts (1C and 1D) and agreement on a nine-point
scale (all other graphs) to the basic questions of the punishment scenario.
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Figure 2. Histograms indicating dollar amounts (2C) and agreement on a nine-point scale (all
other graphs) to the basic questions of the helping scenario.
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Individual differences in altruistic punishment and helping
To examine individual differences in willingness to punish at one’s own expense, we
used the item “What is the most you would be willing to pay to punish this person?” as the
dependent variable in three stepwise multiple regression analyses. In the first, the other five basic
questions were used as the independent variables. The total R2 was .26 (df=153, F=14.7,
p<.0001) with four variables retained in the following order (parentheses report the t-ratio,
significance value, and incremental effect on the total R2 value): How much the cheater should
pay (t=5.10, p<.0001, DR2=.16), the subject’s temptation to cheat (t=2.29, p=.0007, DR2=.06),
anger toward non-punishers (t=2.82, p=.0374, DR2=.02), and anger toward the cheater (t=-2.58,
p=.011, DR2=.03). The second and fourth variables are counterintuitive; evidently, willingness
to pay to punish the cheater is positively related to one’s own temptation to cheat and negatively
related to anger toward the cheater.
The second analysis used the emotion words as the independent variables. Surprisingly,
none of them were significantly related to the dependent variable. The third analysis used the
action words as the dependent variables. The only significant variable was “physically hurt
them” (R2=.09, df=149, F=15.8, p<.0001).
Sex differences in altruistic punishment were examined by dividing the responses into
three categories: willing to pay nothing (n=80), willing to pay between 1-99 dollars (n=30), and
willing to pay greater than 100 dollars (n=37). Males are more frequent in the third category but
the difference is not statistically significant (X2=4.75, df=2, p=.09).
A similar set of analyses was conducted for altruistic helping using the question “What is
the most you would be willing to give?” as the dependent variable. When the other basic
questions were used as the independent variables, the total R2 was .13 (df=156, F=12.2, p<.0001)
with two variables retained in the following order: How much they would like to help the person
(t=4.93, p<.0001, DR2=.10), and a negative correlation with anger toward non-helpers (t=-2.24,
p=.0265, DR2=.02). In the second analysis, none of the emotion words were related. In the third
analysis, the only significant action variable was “help if very serious” (R2=.04, df=151, F=6.94,
p<.01). There was no sex difference in the amount that participants were willing to give
(X2=1.43, df=2, p=.49).
Discussion
The most notable result of the O’Gorman et al. study (2005) was that altruistic
punishment is insensitive to genetic relatedness and potential for future interactions, in contrast
to altruistic helping. The current study used an inventory of emotion and action words to provide
a better indicator of psychological mechanisms. Our results show that participants are sensitive
to genetic relatedness in their response to a social transgression, in contrast to the earlier study. A
cheating cousin provokes a greater negative emotional reaction than a cheating stranger.
However, the more negative emotional response does not lead directly to a more negative
behavioral response. Instead, the behavioral response is modulated in a way that is more negative
toward relatives in some respects (confronting and seeking an apology) and more negative
toward strangers in other respects (warning others about the transgression).
Another complex relationship between emotions and actions exist for altruistic helping.
At the emotional level, participants responded equally to the misfortune of relative and a
stranger, but the undifferentiated emotional response led to very different actions; active helping
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in the case of relatives and avoidance in the case of strangers. Having the participants respond to
an inventory of emotion and action words is a simple and effective technique for identifying
these complex relationships.
No consistent pattern emerges for the potential for future interactions. O’Gorman et al.
(2005) showed no effect for punishment in two replicated experiments and a strong effect for
helping in a single experiment. However, we show no effect for any of our treatments in both
helping and punishing scenarios, a discrepancy that will require future studies to resolve.
Both studies reveal a response to cheating that at first seems paradoxical: Most
participants are very angry and think that the cheater should be punished, but over half are
unwilling to pay even a penny to accomplish the job. These individuals are not necessarily
hypocritical, however, because human life affords many ways to punish cheaters at little or no
personal expense, such as gossiping to undermine their reputation (Wilson, Wilczynski, Wells,
and Weiser, 2000) or avoiding future interactions (Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997). These forms of
punishment can provide a potent outlet for individuals who are very angry but unwilling to invest
their own resources.
The remaining individuals indicate a stronger commitment to “put their money where
their mouth is” by punishing cheaters at their own expense, in amounts ranging from modest to
far greater than what they ($20) or anyone else ($200) lost, as if punishing transgressions is a
matter of principle (Frank, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1987). The commitment to punish at one’s own
expense is not a simple function of emotional intensity. In fact, there is a weak inverse
correlation between the degree of anger and the amount that participants were willing to pay in
the first multiple regression analysis. The strongest correlations were with how much the cheater
should pay, one’s own temptation to cheat, and anger toward others who don’t punish.
A positive correlation between temptation to cheat and willingness to punish other
cheaters is one of the most interesting results of this study. It raises the possibility that “altruistic
punishment” is in fact selfish, a strategy employed by cheaters to eliminate competition from
other cheaters. Eldakar, Farrell, and Wilson (2006) have investigated this possibility in a
computer simulation model that emulates a public goods situation similar to our fictional
scenario and experimental economics games. Even when helping and punishment are initially
uncorrelated traits, a positive correlation between cheating and propensity to punish other
cheaters robustly emerges from the model, suggesting that our empirical result might prove to be
quite general.
The psychological mechanisms the lead to helping and punishment are complex,
including emotional responses that are modulated by other mechanisms to produce behaviors
appropriate to given situations and people. Anger can lead to avoidance, aggression, diplomacy,
or inaction if the costs are too great. Sympathy can lead to direct helping (such as stopping to aid
an accident victim), indirect helping (such as calling 911), or inaction (such as emotionally
responding to a charitable appeal but failing to give money). A combination of methods will be
required to fully understand these mechanisms. This study shows that fictional scenarios provide
a useful tool that can be used in combination with other tools, such as computer simulation
models and studies of actual behavior.
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